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Note
When Judicial Flexibility Becomes Abuse of
Discretion: Eliminating the "Good Cause"
Exception in Indian Child Welfare Act
Adoptive Placements
Erik W. Aamot-Snapp
When the power [to grant an adoption] is used to remove an Indian
child from the surrounding most likely to connect that child with his or
her cultural heritage, that decision unintentionally continues the grad-
ual genocide of the Indians in America.'
Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA)2 to stop the mass removal of Native American children3
from their Native American communities.4 In 1978, state courts
and child welfare workers placed over ninety percent of adopted
1. Quinn v. Walters, 881 P.2d 795, 801 (Or. 1994) (Fadeley, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Fadeley also stated: "The power to grant an adoption, when exer-
cised, changes an individual from membership in one family to another. The
adopted person is lost to his birth family and.., the culture into which he was
born. That is an awesome power." Id. See also In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313,
1316 (Mont. 1981) ("Absent the next generation, any culture is lost and neces-
sarily relegated, at best, to anthropological examination and categorization.").
2. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (1988).
3. The ICWA defines an Indian child as "any unmarried person who is
under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible
for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 1903.
4. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4); H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531 [hereinafter HousE REPORT] ("The
wholesale separation of Indian children from their familieis [sic] is perhaps the
most tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian life today.").
The ICWA's legislative history includes startling results of State child wel-
fare surveys:
[A]pproximately 25-35 percent of all Indian children are separated
from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or in-
stitutions.... [1]n Minnesota, one in every eight Indian children under
18 years of age is living in an adoptive home; and, in 1971-72, nearly
one in every four children under 1 year of age was adopted.... In the
state of Washington, the Indian adoption rate is 19 times greater and
the foster care rate 10 times greater [per capita than for non-Indian
children].
Id.
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Native American children in non-Native American homes.5 By
1994, sixteen years after the ICWA's enactment, more than half
were still adopted by non-Native Americans. 6
The Indian Child Welfare Act controls adoptions of Native
American children by mandating a three-part adoptive place-
ment preference. 7 The Act requires state courts to place Native
American children in the adoptive homes of their extended fami-
lies, other members of their tribes, or other Native American
families.8 The ICWA allows courts to depart from the placement
preference only if they find "good cause" to do so.9 In some juris-
5. House REPORT, supra note 4, at 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
7531. State welfare officials and courts placed Native American children in fos-
ter or adoptive homes up to 16 times as often as non-Native American children.
Id.
6. Donna Halvorsen, Siblings Can't Be Adopted by White Family, Court
Rules, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Jan. 24, 1995, at 1B, 2B [hereinafter Siblings
Can't Be Adopted] (reporting that 60% of Minnesota-born Native American chil-
dren were placed in non-Native American homes in 1994); Donna Halvorsen,
Indian Children Get Courtroom Advocates: Twin Cities Lawyers Aim to Change
System that Ignores Kids' Culture, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), May 16, 1994, at
1B [hereinafter Indian Children Get Courtroom Advocates]. In 1994, Native
American children remained 10 times more likely to be placed outside their
homes than non-Native American children in some states. Id. See also Minne-
sota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System, Final
Report, 16 HAntim L. REV. 477, 624 (1993) [hereinafter Racial Bias Task Force
Report] (reporting Native American children were being removed from their pa-
rental homes two to 22 times more often than non-Native American children).
More than 50,000 Native American children live in non-Native American
households. Donna A. Goldsmith, There is Only One Child, and Her Name is
Children, 36 FED. B. NEWS & J. 446, 446 (1989).
7. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915. The IOWA contains other provisions also
designed to stop the removal of Native American children from their Native
American cultures: the tribe has the right to be notified of child custody pro-
ceedings, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a), and to intervene in these proceedings, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(c); Native American children must be returned to their parent upon vol-
untary withdrawal by the parent of consent to foster care placement, adoptive
placement, or termination of parental rights, 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b)-(c); Native
American parents or tribes may petition to invalidate a foster placement or ter-
mination of parental rights upon a showing that the action violated certain pro-
visions of the Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1914.
8. According to the ICWA:
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a prefer-
ence shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a
placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other
members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families.
25 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
9. Id. State courts consider determination of good cause a discretionary
function. In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Alaska 1993); In re Ap-
peal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 667 P.2d 228, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1983); In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 311 (Ind. 1988) ("Primary re-
sponsibility for interpreting the language of the [ICWA] rests with the courts
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dictions, parties in over half of the ICWA adoptive placement
proceedings raise the issue of "good cause" to deviate from the
placement preferences.' 0 Unfortunately, the ICWA does not de-
fine what constitutes "good cause." State courts have thus ap-
plied a variety of factors in attempting to define the good cause
provision." In practice, these factors provide a channel through
deciding the custody proceedings of Indian children."), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1069 (1989); In re Bird Head, 331 N.W.2d 785, 791 (Neb. 1983); In re Adoption
of M., 832 P.2d 518, 522 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Peter W. Gorman & Michelle T.
Paquin, Custody and Ethnicity: Placing Native Children in Minnesota, 48
BENCH & BAR MINN. 22, 25 (1991); Robert J. McCarthy, The Indian Child Wel-
fare Act: In the Best Interests of the Child and Tribe, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
864, 868 (1993).
Congress used the term "good cause" in the ICWA to give courts flexibility
in placement proceedings. Guidelines for State Courts, Indian Child Custody
Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,584 (1979) [hereinafter BIA Guidelines]
(citing S. REP. No. 597, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1977)); Bird Head, 331 N.W.2d
at 791 (holding that factual evidence of good cause must exist in the trial court
record when placing Native American children outside the preferences).
10. See Oversight of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearing Before
the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 158, 162 (1984) [here-
inafter 1984 Hearings] (statement of Eric Eberhard, Deputy Attorney General,
Department of Justice, Navajo Indian Nation). One witness at the 1984 Over-
sight hearing testified:
[We are finding that the State court judges are having a field day with
the language "good cause to the contrary." What is good cause to the
contrary? In our situation, if a Navajo family lives 50 miles from the
nearest hospital, we have had State court judges declare that to be
good cause to the contrary. If the State social worker tells the judge
that the nearest school is 40 miles away, we have had judges declare
that to be good cause to the contrary.... This problem is probably the
most serious one that we face. Out of 200 cases that we have handled
in the last 15 months, this has been an issue in over half.
Id. at 161-62.
11. State courts interpreting the good cause exception have reached oppo-
site results in factually similar cases. Compare Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at
1361 (finding good cause to place Indian child for adoption with non-Native
American foster parents of 12 months) with In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d
357 (Minn. 1994) (refusing to find good cause to place Indian children with non-
Native American foster parents of 14 months), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3560
(U.S. Jan. 23, 1995). As a result, the outcome of adoption proceedings involving
Native American children depends largely upon the state in which the action
arises.
Some state courts have found "good cause" to place a child outside Native
American communities by evaluating factors such as parental placement pref-
erences, Adoption ofF.H, 851 P.2d at 1364-65; emotional bonding, id. at 1365;
Appeal in Marieopa County Juvenile Action, 667 P.2d at 234; and the tradi-
tional concept of the child's best interests, Adoption of N.P.S., 868 P.2d 934,
938-39 (Alaska 1994). Other courts, by applying a more restrictive evaluation
of factors constituting good cause, have not departed from the statutory prefer-
ences and have placed children within Native American communities. Custody
of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 364-65 (evaluating the child's extraordinary emotional
needs, a factor set out in the BIA Guidelines, supra note 9).
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which systemic judicial bias12 infects ICWA proceedings, under-
mining the Act's purpose of protecting the relationship between
Native American communities and their children.'
3
This Note analyzes the factors state courts use in determin-
ing good cause. Part I examines the historical background of the
ICWA and interpretations of its provisions, particularly the
adoptive placement preference. Part II critiques the factors that
state courts most often apply in determining good cause to de-
part from the preference, concluding that courts' use of these
factors ultimately circumvents the Act's purposes. Part III pro-
poses replacing the general good cause exception with a
mandatory order of placements, which would require placement
of Native American children in Native American homes. This
Note concludes that a mandatory order of placements with cer-
tain strictly defined exceptions would best effectuate Congress's
goal of preserving Native American communities by restricting
state court discretion in child placement proceedings.
State courts face not only legal issues, but also the issue of placing children
who may have been moved among several foster homes. If the courts find good
cause exists to place the children outside the Native American community, the
children may lose their cultural identity, but gain a permanent home. If the
courts do not find good cause, the children may remain in foster care until a
Native American adoptive placement becomes available, but the children would
retain their cultural heritage. The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that
"[diecisions on the custody of children, even when the cultural values are simi-
lar, are often the most difficult for our trial and appellate judges." Id. at 366.
12. Judicial bias may be unintentional, even unconscious: "For most
judges, for most lawyers, for most human beings, we are as unconscious of our
value patterns as we are of the oxygen that we breathe." McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 565 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing FELIX S. COHEN,
LEGAL CONSCmNCE 169 (1960)).
13. In the ICWA, Congress declared its findings that "the States, exercising
their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through ad-
ministrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tri-
bal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing
in Indian communities and families." 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5).
One commentator, recognizing the undermining of congressional policy
through judicially created exceptions to the ICWA, stated: "Underlying the en-
actment of the ICWA was the Congressional concern about coercive state action
by state officials, social workers, courts, and adoption agencies. Yet the judi-
cially created exception is itself coercive state activity that undermines the fed-
eral legislation." Toni Hahn Davis, The Existing Indian Family Exception to the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 7 AM. J. FAM. L. 189, 202 (1993) (discussing refusal of
courts to apply the ICWA in the absence of an "existing Indian family"); see also
Patrice Kunesh, Building Strong, Stable Indian Communities Through the In-
dian Child Welfare Act, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 753, 755 (1993) ("he 'good
cause to the contrary' provision, in particular, [is] employed as [a basis] ... for
avoiding application of the ICWA's placement preferences.").
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I. THE ICWA'S CRITICAL MISSION: PRESERVING
NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES
A. TE ICWA's DUAL PURPOSES: GUARDING NATIVE AMERICAN
CULTURES AND REIGNING IN STATE COURT DISCRETION
In 1978, Congress decried the inherent bias within the so-
cial welfare system, including the courts, 14 which caused re-
moval of Native American children from their communities at
an alarming rate. 15 This rampant displacement of Native Amer-
ican children and the country's long history of depriving Native
American cultures of their youngest members' 6 led Congress to
create minimum federal standards for state court child place-
ment proceedings involving Native American children.17 The
Act attempted primarily to prevent state courts from abusing
their discretion over custody decisions. 18
14. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5); supra note 13 (citing § 1901(5)). See also In-
dian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearings on S.1214 Before the Subcomm. on
Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 190, 192 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Hearings] (testi-
mony of Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians)
("Many of the individuals who decide the fate of our children are at best igno-
rant of our cultural values, and at worst contemptful of the Indian way and
convinced that removal, usually to a non-Indian household or institution, can
only benefit an Indian child.").
15. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (reporting removal and
placement rates included in the legislative history of the ICWA).
16. Congress heard historical testimony regarding removal of children
from their homes to federal boarding schools. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at
9, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7531. The federal government established
Native American boarding schools in the 19th century to replace tribal values
and ways of life with white European values. INDIAN EDUCATION TASK FORCE,
94TH CONG., 2D SEss., FImAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN hNDIAN POLICY REVIEw
COMMISSION 57-58 (Comm. Print 1976). The government reportedly kidnapped
Native American children from their families to assure attendance at the
boarding schools. SALLY J. McBETH, ETHNIC IDENTITY AND THE BOARDING
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE OF WEST-CENTRAL OKLAHOMA AMERICAN INDIANS 3 (1983).
See also Linda J. Lacey, The White Man's Law and the American Indian Family
in the Assimilation Era, 40 ARm. L. REv. 327, 349-372 (1986) (discussing the
assimilationist policy implemented by the United States government); Rennard
Strickland, Genocide-At-Law:An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native
American Experience, 34 KAN. L. REv. 713, 718-735 (1986) (discussing the his-
tory of the Native American experience).
17. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (setting forth specific "minimum Federal standards
for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of In-
dian culture").
18. Id.
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In the ICWA, Congress also endeavored to design adoption
standards that reflect Native American cultural values.19 The
Act's congressional findings recognize that children constitute
the most vital resource of Native American tribes in their quest
for continued existence and integrity.20 Congress declared that
the ICWA upholds the United States's policy of protecting Na-
tive American children's best interests, and promoting the sta-
bility and security of Native American tribes and families.
21
B. THE ADOPTIvE PLACEMENT PREFERENCE OF THE ICWA:
KEEPING CHILDREN WITHIN THEIR NATIVE AMERICAN
CULTURES
In § 1915 of the ICWA, Congress created an order of adop-
tive placement preferences in favor of a member of the child's
family, another member of the child's tribe, or other Native
American families.22 Section 1915 and its legislative history ex-
pressly alert state courts that Native American cultural stan-
19. Id. Native American cultures vary widely, and "it is impossible to de-
scribe a typical American Indian family." Lacey, supra note 16, at 330; see also
Strickland, supra note 16, at 715-16 ("The contemporary American Indian is as
varied as the Kansas Kickapoo, the Florida Seminole, the New York Mohawk,
the Datotas' Sioux, the New Mexico Pueblo, the Arizona Navajo, and the
Oklahoma Cherokee, not to mention the Alaskan Village native."). Generaliza-
tions are not entirely impossible, though, when comparing Native American
cultures to Anglo-American majority culture. Lacey, supra note 16, at 330
("[Tihere are certain generalizations that can be made about non-assimilated
American Indian families for purposes of comparison with the Anglo-American
model.").
20. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) ("IT]here is no resource that is more vital to the
continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and.*..
the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children
who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.").
21. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 ('The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of
this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the
stability and security of Indian tribes and families.").
22. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See supra note 8 (quoting § 1915(a)). The ICWA
also specifies the following preferences for foster placement proceedings:
In any foster care or preadoptive placement, a preference shall be
given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement
with-
(i) a member of the Indian child's extended family;
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child's
tribe;
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-
Indian licensing authority; or
(iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated
by an Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the
Indian child's needs.
25 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
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dards must control adoptive placements. 23 The Act affords
courts a degree of discretion, however, by providing that the
placement preference applies "in the absence of good cause to
the contrary."24 Guiding state court interpretation of the good
cause exception, the Act notes that courts might, where appro-
priate, consider the preferences of the child or the child's par-
ents,25 and suggests that tribes might substitute their own order
of preferences by resolution, "so long as the placement is the
least restrictive setting appropriate to the particular needs of
the child."26 Thus, § 1915 "establish[es] a Federal policy that,
where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian
23. Section 1915(d) states that: "The standards to be applied in meeting
the preference requirements of this section shall be the prevailing social and
cultural standards of the Indian community in which the parent or extended
family resides or with which the parent or extended family members maintain
social and cultural ties." 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
The section's legislative history adds: "All too often, State public and pri-
vate agencies, in determining whether or not an Indian family is fit for...
adoptive placement of an Indian child, apply a white, middle-class standard
which, in many cases, forecloses placement with an Indian family." House RF-
PORT, supra note 4, at 24, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C-A.N. at 7546.
24. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See also supra note 9 (discussing the discretionary
nature of the good cause exception). "Good cause to the contrary" language also
appears in the ICWA's foster care placement preferences provision, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b), and its transfer of proceedings to tribal courts provision, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(b) ("[Ihe [state] court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary,
shall transfer [foster care or termination of parental rights proceedings] to the
jurisdiction of the tribe.").
The ICWA fails to provide the standard of proof required to show good
cause to depart from the placement preferences. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915. Few
state courts have addressed this issue. See In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d
1361, 1363 (Alaska 1993) (requiring only a preponderance of the evidence to
prove good cause); In re Custody of S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that good cause must be proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence), rev'd on other grounds, 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 63
U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1995). The ICWA does provide high standards of
proof, however, for other actions falling under its coverage. To terminate pa-
rental rights, the ICWA requires "evidence beyond a reasonable doubt ... that
the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to
result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child." 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(f). Similarly, to order a foster placement, the court must receive "clear
and convincing evidence" that the present placement is likely to cause damage
to the child. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e). Although relevant to the determination of
good cause, discussion of the proper standard of proof lies beyond the scope of
this Note.
25. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c).
26. Id. See, e.g., In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 313 (Ind. 1988)
(reporting that the Ogalala Sioux tribal code prohibits adoption of a tribal mem-
ber by a non-Indian family pursuant to § 1915(c), but refusing to apply the
tribe's preference due to a finding of "good cause" not to do so), cert. denied. 490
U.S. 1069 (1989).
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community, but is not to be read as precluding the placement of
an Indian child with a non-Indian family."
27
In practice, the operation of § 1915 arises when a state court
determines that the ICWA applies to a particular case and the
court retains jurisdiction, rather than transferring the action to
a tribal court.28 Initially, the court must find that the action is a
"child custody proceeding"29 and that the child is an "Indian
child."30 Upon finding that the Act applies, the court must fur-
ther evaluate provisions pertaining to tribal and state court ju-
risdiction. 31  The Act grants the tribal court exclusive
27. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 23, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C_.N. at
7546.
28. These applicability and jurisdictional issues have generated volumi-
nous commentary. See, e.g., Roger M. Baron, The Resurgence of the "Tribal In-
terest" in Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 26 TULSA L.J. 315 (1991) (arguing
tribal interest is jurisdictional in nature and the best interests of the child stan-
dard is therefore inapplicable); Michael Dale, State Court Jurisdiction Under
the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Unstated Best Interest of the Child Test, 27
GONZ. L. REV. 353, 365-70 (1992) (arguing state courts use jurisdictional ap-
proaches to avoid the IOWA); Peter W. Gorman & Michelle Paquin, A Minnesota
Lawyer's Guide to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 10 LAw & INEQ. J. 311 (1992)
(explaining operation of IOWA); Gorman & Paquin, supra note 9 (same); McCar-
thy, supra note 9 (arguing that many state courts find ways to limit application
of the Act).
The placement preferences of § 1915 do not apply to child custody proceed-
ings in tribal courts. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (indicating that the ICWA applies
"[uin any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law").
29. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1). The Act defines "child custody proceeding" as a
foster care placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement or
adoptive placement. Id. "Adoptive placement" means "the permanent place-
ment of an Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in a final
decree of adoption." Id. The Act does not apply to divorce or juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. Id.
30. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4);.see supra note 3 (quoting the ICWA definition of
"Indian child"). Many cases have interpreted this provision. See, e.g., In re Ap-
peal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 667 P.2d 228, 232-33 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1983); Quinn v. Walters, 881 P.2d 795 (Or. 1994); In re Colnar, 757 P.2d 534
(Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
31. Congress set out the ICWA jurisdictional provision in § 1911:
Indian tribe jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings
(a) Exclusive jurisdiction. An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction ex-
clusive as to any state over any child custody proceeding involving an
Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such
tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by
existing Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court,
the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding
the residence or domicile of the child.
(b) Transfer of proceedings; declination by tribal court. In any state
court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of pa-
rental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the
reservation of the Indian child's tribe, the court, in the absence of good
cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction
INDIAN CHILD ADOPTIONS
jurisdiction if the child is domiciled or resides on a reservation.32
If a child is not domiciled on a reservation, the ICWA creates
"concurrent but presumptively tribal jurisdiction."33 The state
court, if it retains jurisdiction, must follow all of the Act's sub-
stantive provisions, including the adoptive placement
preference.3 4
Although the Supreme Court considers the adoptive place-
ment preference "[t]he most important substantive requirement
imposed on state courts"35 by the ICWA, Congress left determi-
of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of
either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe: Pro-
vided, That such transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal
court of such tribe.
25 U.S.C. § 1911.
Public Law 280 ("P.L. 280") divests some tribes of jurisdiction over civil
matters, including child custody proceedings, and grants that jurisdiction to the
states. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)). It currently affects at least six states
with large Native American populations: Alaska, California, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Joan H. Hollinger, Adoption of Native Ameri-
can Children, in ADOPTION LAw AND PRAcTICE § 15.02(1) (Joan H. Hollinger et
al. eds., 1989). Section 1918 of the ICWA allows tribes to reassume jurisdiction
by petitioning the Department of the Interior with a "suitable plan to exercise
such jurisdiction." 25 U.S.C. § 1918. P.L. 280, however, remains "the single
most restrictive federal law regarding tribal exercise of exclusive or referral ju-
risdiction over child custody matters." Gorman & Paquin, supra note 28, at
325.
32. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) Courts must determine a child's domicile by refer-
ence to the domicile of the child's parents, which is defined as "physical pres-
ence in a place in connection with a certain state of mind concerning one's
intent to remain there." Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30, 48 (1989).
33. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36; see 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). Upon petition by
either a parent, the child's Native American custodian, or the child's tribe, the
state court must, "in the absence of good cause to the contrary," transfer the
proceeding to the tribal court. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). The Act allows the state
court to retain jurisdiction if either parent objects to a transfer or if the tribal
court declines jurisdiction. Id.
Courts have frequently used the "good cause" provision contained in
§ 1911(b) to avoid tribal court jurisdiction. Dale, supra note 28, at 363. See,
e.g., In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 80-82 (Mont. 1990) (finding need for stability and
Native American character of foster home "good cause"), cert. denied, 500 U.S.
917 (1991); In re Interest of C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105, 113-18 (Neb. 1992) (finding
attachment to foster parents "good cause"); Chester County Dep't of Social
Servs. v. Coleman, 399 S.E.2d 773 (S.C. 1990) (finding expense and difficulty of
venue transfer "good cause"), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 918 (1991); In re J.J., 454
N.W.2d 317, 328-31 (S.D. 1990) (finding "good cause" where children had little
previous contact with tribe, transfer would be forum non conveniens, or trans-
fer petition comes late in the proceedings).
34. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
35. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36 (1989).
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nation of good cause to state courts' discretion.3 6 The improba-
ble combination of congressional mandate in the placement
preference and state court discretion in the good cause provision
has resulted in government attempts to clarify the meaning of
"absent good cause." In particular, the Department of the Inte-
rior Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") promulgated guidelines
("BIA Guidelines") to assist state courts applying the ICWA. 37
The BIA Guidelines suggest factors for courts to consider when
determining good cause, including the child's or parent's place-
ment preferences, the child's extraordinary emotional or physi-
cal needs, and the unavailability of suitable homes fitting the
placement preferences. 38 Courts have looked to the BIA Guide-
lines for assistance in determining good cause, while recognizing
their nonbinding character.3 9
36. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing courts' discretion
in determining good cause to depart from placement preferences). As one com-
mentator notes: "[The ICWA] establishes placement standards that are compat-
ible with Indian goals, [but] the act leaves state courts relatively free to choose
whether or not to follow them." Russel L. Barsh, The Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978: A Critical Analysis, 31 HAsrINGS L.J. 1287, 1321 (1980).
37. BIA Guidelines, supra note 9.
38. Good Cause to Modify Preferences
(a) For purposes of foster care, preadoptive or adoptive placement, a
determination of good cause not to follow the order of preference set
out above shall be based on one or more of the following considerations:
(i) The request of the biological parents or the child when the child is
of sufficient age.
(ii) The extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the child as es-
tablished by testimony of a qualified expert witness.
(iii) The unavailability of suitable families for placement after a dili-
gent search has been completed for families meeting the preference
criteria.
Id. at 67,594. The BIA Guidelines place the burden of proving good cause on
the proponent of a departure from the placement preferences, but do not estab-
lish a standard of proof. See id.
39. Courts give the non-binding BIA Guidelines important, but not control-
ling, significance. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424 (1977) (stat-
ing that "administrative interpretations of statutory terms are given important
but not controlling significance"); Adoption of N.P.S., 868 P.2d 934, 936 (Alaska
1994); In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Alaska 1993); In re Robert
T., 200 Cal.App.3d 657, 663 (Ct. App. 1988) ("[The BIA Guidelines] are a useful
aid in interpreting [the ICWA's] provisions."); In re T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 307
(Ind. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069 (1989); In re Halloway, 732 P.2d 962,
970 (Utah 1986). The Guidelines represent the Department of the Interior's
interpretations of the Act. BIA Guidelines, supra note 9, at 67,584 ("Many of
these guidelines represent the interpretation of the Interior Department of cer-
tain provisions of the Act. Other guidelines provide procedures which, if fol-
lowed, will help assure that rights guaranteed by the Act are protected when
state courts decide Indian child custody matters.").
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C. THE SuPREME CouRT's HOLYFIELD DECISION: RECOGNIZING
THE MuTuAL INTERESTS OF TRIBES AND THEmCHILDREN
The Supreme Court has addressed the broad discretionary
power that the ICWA permits state courts to exercise. In its only
ICWA case, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,40
the Court held that state courts could not interpret undefined
terms within the ICWA so as to undermine the Act's goals and
policy.41 In Holyfield, the Mississippi Supreme Court had relied
upon its state law definition of "domicile" to hold that two Native
American children were not domiciled on the Choctaw reserva-
tion, thereby precluding application of the ICWA and transfer of
jurisdiction to the tribal court.42
The Supreme Court held that although the ICWA failed to
define "domicile," Congress did not intend courts to apply state
law definitions to the term if those definitions defeat the spirit of
the Act.43 Reliance on state law definitions, the Court reasoned,
would exacerbate Congress's concern that "the States and their
courts [are] partly responsible for the problem [the ICWA] in-
tended to correct."44 The Court declared that although Congress
failed to define domicile, it nonetheless "intended a uniform fed-
eral law of domicile for the ICWA,"45 for "a statute under which
different rules apply from time to time to the same child, simply
40. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
41. Id. at 42-47.
42. 511 So. 2d 918, 921 (Miss.), rev'd, 490 U.S. at 39-40; see supra notes 31-
32 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of domicile in ICWA
litigation).
43. 490 U.S. at 43-47. In Holyfield, the Native American parents of twin
children purposely left the reservation to give birth in order to circumvent tri-
bal child placement jurisdiction and allow the children to be adopted by a white
family. Id. at 51. The Chancery Court issued a final decree of adoption which
the Tribe moved to vacate on the grounds that it violated the exclusive tribal
jurisdiction provision of the IOWA. Id. at 38-39. The court's decision to over-
rule the motion was affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court. Id. at 39. The
Supreme Court, however, held that the children's domicile was that of their
mother, who was at all times domiciled on the reservation, and the tribe there-
fore had exclusive jurisdiction over any child custody proceeding in which these
children were involved. Id. at 48-49.
44. Id. at 45.
45. Id. at 47. The Court cited the conflicting results obtained by applying
state law definitions of domicile in cases arising in Mississippi and in New Mex-
ico. Id. at 46-47 (comparing the facts of Holyfield with those of In re Adoption of
Baby Child, 700 P.2d 198, 200-01 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the tribe
had exclusive jurisdiction because under New Mexico law the child took its
mother's domicile at birth)).
1995] 1177
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1167
as a result of his or her transport from one State to another,
cannot be what Congress had in mind."46
The Court also found that the individual actions of any
member of the tribe, even the child's parents, could not defeat
the Act.47 Allowing parents to bypass the Act would reject the
tribe's interest in its children48 and would ignore the detrimen-
tal impact on children of placement outside Native American
cultures.4 9 Protecting the relationship between children and
their tribes, the Court concluded, serves the best interests of Na-
tive American children.50 The Court's holdings close the juris-
dictional gap created by state law definitions of "domicile" and
guide state court treatments of parental preference; they do not,
however, consider state court definitions of "good cause" that de-
feat the Act's adoptive placement preferences. Nonetheless,
Holyfield's statements regarding the policies of the ICWA and its
interpretation of Congress's intent color any future judicial in-
terpretation of the Act's provisions.
D. INCONSISTENT FINDINGS OF GOOD CAUSE IN THE STATE
COURTS: ADOPTIOv OF F - AND CUSTODY OF S.E..
Courts that have defined good cause have considered a vari-
ety of factors that have led to placement outside the ICWA's
preferences. 51 Many courts have placed children outside Native
46. Id. at 46.
47. Id. at 49.
48. Id. The Court cited numerous provisions in the Act according certain
rights to the tribe that protect tribal interests in their children, in addition to
protecting the interests of the children and their families. Id.
49. Id. at 49-50. The Court favorably quoted the ICWA's legislative his-
tory, which states: "'TR]emoval of Indian children from their cultural setting
seriously impacts a long-term tribal survival and has damaging social and psy-
chological impact on many individual Indian children.'" Id. at 50 (citation
omitted).
50. Id. at 50 n.24 (citing In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No.
S-903, 635 P.2d 187, 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)).
Congress, in enacting the ICWA, recognized the ambiguity of the tradi-
tional best interests standard. Legislative history of the ICWA demonstrates
Congress's belief that the best interests standard is "vague, at best.., judges
too may find it difficult, in utilizing vague standards like 'the best interests of
the child', to avoid decisions resting on subjective values." HousE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 19, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7542 (citing Smith v.
Offer, 431 U.S. 820, 835 (1977)).
51. The Alaska Supreme Court stated: "Whether there is good cause to de-
viate in a particular case depends on many factors including, but not necessar-
ily limited to, the best interests of the child, the wishes of the biological parents,
the suitability of persons preferred for placement and the child's ties to the
tribe." In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1363-64 (Alaska 1993).
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American communities after evaluating, for example, the biolog-
ical parents' placement preferences,52 bonding or attachment of
the child with the prospective adoptive parents,53 or a series of
considerations constituting the traditional legal notion of the
child's best interests.54 One court has confined its evaluation to
the nonbinding BIA Guidelines' formulation of good cause.55
In In re Adoption of F.H.,56 the Alaska Supreme Court eval-
uated a variety of subjective factors. The court granted the
adoption of a Native American child by a white couple despite
the Alaska child welfare system's recommendation for place-
ment of the child with a Native relative who had also petitioned
for her adoption.57 The court discussed the purpose of the
ICWA, 58 its underlying policy,59 and its legislative history.
60
Nevertheless, the court proceeded to analyze good cause, result-
Similarly, the Washington Appeals Court stated that permissible factors
include: "the best interests of the child, the wishes of the biological parents, the
suitability of persons preferred for placement, the child's ties to the tribe, and
the child's ability to make any cultural adjustments necessitated by a particu-
lar placement." In re Adoption of M., 832 P.2d 518, 522 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(citations omitted).
The Minnesota Supreme Court, on the other hand, embraced the BIA
Guidelines for defining good cause. In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357,
363 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1995); see supra
notes 37-39 and accompanying text (discussing the BIA Guidelines' factors for
determining good cause).
52. See, e.g., Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1364-65 (considering maternal
preference in determining good cause to deviate from ICWA preferences).
53. See, e.g., id. at 1365 (stating that bonding between adoptive parents
and child is a proper factor for courts to consider in evaluating good cause); In re
Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 667 P.2d 228, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1983) (supporting good cause determination with evidence of a strong mother-
child relationship with the adoptive mother).
54. See, e.g., Adoption of N.P.S., 868 P.2d 934, 937-38 (Alaska 1994) (ana-
lyzing such factors as educational, cultural, and emotional needs of the child).
See also Dale, supra note 28, at 365-70 (describing the Anglo best interests test
as evaluating "what is best for the child in terms of adequacy of education,
safety in the home and community environment, access to certain kinds of cul-
tural, health and other services, and amenities in the home"); Christian R. Van
Deusen, The Best Interests of the Child and the Law, 18 PlPP. L. REv. 417, 419
(1991) (describing the traditional best interests standard as "a rather nebulous
and ill-defined standard that opens a plethora of considerations").
55. Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 363. See supra notes 37-39 and ac-
companying text (outlining the BIA Guidelines).
56. 851 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993).
57. Id. at 1365.
58. Id. at 1364 ("ICWA was enacted to discourage the separation of Indian
children from their families or tribes through adoption or foster care placement
to non-Indian homes." (citation omitted)).
59. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1902).
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ing in placement of F.H. outside her Native community.6 ' Sev-
eral subjective factors influenced the court's holding, including
the mother's preference, 62 the bond between F.H. and one of the
adoptive parents, 63 F.H.'s need for permanent placement, 64 and
the adoptive couple's willingness to grant the birth mother ac-
cess to the child.65
Not every court, however, has endorsed the approach sanc-
tioned in cases such as In re Adoption of F.H..66 In direct con-
trast, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in In re Custody of
S.E.G.,67 refused to uphold the adoption of three Native Ameri-
can sisters by a non-Native American couple, despite the possi-
bility that without the adoption the children would remain in
foster care. 68 The court found that good cause did not exist to
depart from the ICWA's placement preferences.69
The Minnesota Supreme Court, acknowledging the subjec-
tive nature of the traditional best interests standard70 and the
60. Id. at 1364 ("Congress found that no resource 'is more vital to the con-
tinued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children.'" (quoting
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfleld, 490 U.S. 30, 38 (1989)).
61. Id. The court rejected the tribe's argument that under Holyfield, the
preference of the biological parent cannot outweigh the tribe's interest. Id.
Without discussing any aspect of the reasoning in Holyfield, the court limited
Holyfield to issues of jurisdiction only. Id.
62. Id. at 1364-65.
63. Id. at 1365.
64. Id.
65. Id. Under the adoption agreement, the biological mother retained con-
tact and visitation rights. Id. at 1363. Also, F.H. held inheritance rights from
the biological mother. Id. The court referred to this type of adoption arrange-
ment as an "open" adoption. Id.
66. 851 P.2d at 1361; see In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action,
667 P.2d 228, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (finding good cause to depart from
IWCA preferences); In re Baby Girl A., 282 Cal. Rptr. 105, 110 (Ct. App. 1991)
(acknowledging good cause exception to ICWA preferences); In re Adoption of
M., 832 P.2d 518, 522 n.5 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (stating good cause exception
exists to grant trial court flexibility in determining the placement of child).
67. 521 N.W.3d 357 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Jan.
23, 1995). S.E.G., A.L.W., and V.M.G., Native American sisters ages 10, 9, and
7, lived in several foster homes before being placed in the foster home of Eugene
and Carol Campbell. Id. at 359-60; Rhonda Hillbery, What's Permanent? Rul-
ing Validates Indian View of Stability, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 16,1994,
at 16A. The Campbells, a non-Native American couple, provided foster care for
the three sisters for 14 months. 521 N.W.2d at 359-60. They, like the Hartleys
in Adoption of F.H., sought adoption of the Native American children in their
foster care. Id. at 357.
68. 521 N.W.2d at 361.
69. Id. at 366.
70. Id. at 363. The court stated: 'The best interests of the child standard,
by its very nature, requires a subjective evaluation of a multitude of factors,
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intent of the ICWA to restrict state court control over Native
American child custody proceedings, 71 applied the BIA Guide-
lines in evaluating "good cause."72 The court specifically re-
jected the lower court's finding that the children had an
extraordinary emotional need for permanence, 73 noting that Na-
tive American cultures define permanency differently than the
majority white culture74 and that Native American standards
must control in ICWA proceedings. 75
JI. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN FINDING GOOD CAUSE
TO DEPART FROM THE ICWA'S PLACEMENT
PREFERENCES: FLEXIBILITY OR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION?
The child's best interests, a catch-all category for several
distinct factors, and the parent's placement preference fre-
quently comprise part of the good cause analysis of state courts
in ICWA adoptive placement proceedings.76 Examination of
these common good cause factors in light of the ICWA's purposes
demonstrates the need to remove state courts' discretionary
power to stray from the adoptive placement preferences. 77
many, if not all of which are imbued with the values of majority culture." Id.
The court then applied reasoning similar to that used by the Supreme Court in
Holyfield: "It therefore seems 'most improbable' that Congress intended to allow
state courts to find good cause whenever they determined that a placement
outside the preferences of § 1915 was in the Indian child's best interests." Id.
(citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 45
(1989)).
71. Id. at 362-63.
72. Id. at 363. In support of its reliance on the BIA Guidelines, the court
stated that "the use of the word shall in [the good cause section of the Guide-
lines] strongly suggests that a consideration of whether good cause exists
should be limited to the factors described in the guidelines." Id. (quoting BIA
Guidelines, supra note 9). The court relied on the guidelines after declining to
apply the factors considered by the Adoption of F.H. and Adoption of M. courts.
Id. at 362-63. See supra note 51 (quoting the lists of factors outlined by these
courts to be considered in determining good cause).
73. 521 N.W.2d at 364. The court believed the trial court's holding was
-based on the "improper assumption" that only adoption could satisfy the chil-
dren's extraordinary emotional needs for permanency. Id. The court, in effect,
endorsed the Minnesota Human Services Commissioner's position that perma-
nent placement in a Native American foster home is often preferable to adop-
tive placement outside the statutory preferences. Id. at 363-64.
74. Id. at 364 (citing legislative history of the ICWA contained in HousE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.AN. at 7532).
75. Id. at 363.
76. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (cataloguing state court
approaches to good cause determination).
77. One commentator noted:
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A. THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS STANDARD: A FREQUENTLY
CITED FACTOR FOR FINDING GOOD CAUSE
1. A Standard Imbued with Majority Culture Values
State courts persistently evaluate Native American chil-
dren's best interests by considering what courts perceive as their
needs for permanent placement and psychological attachment. 78
Majority culture values, however, permeate these good cause
factors. As the Minnesota Supreme Court observed, "It]he best
interests of the child standard, by its very nature, requires a
subjective evaluation of a multitude of factors, many, if not all of
which are imbued with the values of majority culture."79
a. The Child's Need for Permanence
Permanency constitutes one value-laden good cause factor.
Courts have found that permanent placement in a stable family
unit serves a Native American child's best interests.80 Native
American communities, however, view permanence differently
than the majority culture.81 Native American children may
Although it establishes placement standards that are compatible with
Indian goals, the Act leaves state courts relatively free to choose
whether or not to follow them. Thus, the opinions of state court judges
as to what is best for the child in individual custody proceedings ulti-
mately may take precedence over both the preferences set forth in the
Act and any preferences legislated by the tribes.
Barsh, supra note 36, at 1321.
78. See, e.g., In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Alaska 1993)
(evaluating psychological attachment and need for permanent placement); In re
Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 667 P.2d 228, 234
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (evaluating psychological attachment).
Professor Dale points to cases in which the Anglo best interests of the child
test operates to avoid the act when courts applied it to a determination of (1)
domicile, (2) whether a child is an Indian child, (3) whether an Indian family is
involved, (4) whether the case falls within the Act's divorce exception, and (5)
whether good cause exists to deny transfer from state court to a tribal court.
Dale, supra note 28, at 375.
79. Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 363.
80. See, e.g., Adoption of F.H, 851 P.2d at 1365 (defining the need for per-
manency as a desire for a stable family household); In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 80-
81 (Mont. 1990) (equating permanency with household stability), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 917 (1991).
81. The ICWA's legislative history states:
In judging the fitness of a particular family, many social workers, igno-
rant of Indian cultural values and social norms, make decisions that
are wholly inappropriate in the context of Indian family life.... For
example, the dynamics of Indian extended families are largely misun-
derstood. An Indian child may have scores of, perhaps more than a
hundred, relatives who are counted as close, responsible members of
the family. Many social workers, untutored in the ways of Indian fain-
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spend considerable amounts of time living with various rela-
tives,8 2 rather than within the majority culture's traditional nu-
clear family.83 Courts too often overestimate the importance of
the nuclear family structure to Native American children and
assume that placing children in such a structure best serves
their interests, even if that means placement outside the Native
community.8 4
In In re Adoption of F.H.,85 for example, the state court up-
held a Native American child's "need for permanence" to the ex-
clusion of the child's and the tribe's cultural interests.86 The
Alaska Supreme Court held that F.H. required immediate place-
ment in a permanent home, opining that "F.H.'s situation would
be uncertain if the [non-Native couple's] adoption petition were
dismissed."8 7 By making a nuclear version of family perma-
nence so central to its analysis, the court overlooked obvious al-
ily life or assuming them to be socially irresponsible, consider leaving
the child with persons outside the nuclear family as neglect.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7533
(discussing the need for revision of the standards used to define mistreatment).
82. Id. at 11, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.-N. at 7533 (discussing the con-
flict between Native and non-Native social systems and how this conflict affects
due process of law in Native child custody proceedings); see also Lacey, supra
note 16, at 347 (discussing Anglo and Native American 19th century child-rear-
ing practices and how they affected reform policy during the assimilationist
era).
83. "[Many American Indians perceive themselves as part of the larger
cultural group, not as completely autonomous individuals. Every child belongs
to both its 'nuclear' family and to the tribe. Prior to the arrival of Anglo-
Europeans in North America, an orphaned child was virtually unheard of in
Indian tribal societies." Donna J. Goldsmith, Individual vs. Collective Rights:
The Indian Child Welfare Act, 13 HARv. WosiEN's L.J. 1, 5 (1990) (citations
omitted).
84. See, e.g., Adoption of F.H, 851 P.2d at 1365 (upholding trial court de-
termination that permanent adoption, although outside the Native community,
was preferable to the child facing an uncertain family status within the commu-
nity). As a result of courts' best interests analyses, Native American families
must conform their lifestyles and child-rearing practices to those of the majority
culture in order to satisfy the Anglo best interest standard and keep their chil-
dren within their communities. For example, middle class white standards
may make it very difficult for Native American families to qualify as adoptive
families. See HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 11, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7533 (discussing discriminatory standards based on middle
class values making it nearly impossible for Native American households to
qualify as foster or adoptive placements); Hollinger, supra note 31, § 15.06(3)
(reporting that "Indian lawyers and other tribal representatives also call for
more flexible and culturally-sensitive criteria for the selection of Indian foster
or adoptive parents").
85. 851 P.2d at 1361.
86. Id. at 1365.
87. Id.
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ternative solutions more consistent with the ICWA's purpose.
For example, the court could have rejected the non-Native
couple's adoption petition and ordered the superior court on re-
mand to consider placement of F.H. with her Native American
cousin, who was willing and ready to adopt her.88 Such blatant
disregard of Congress's "[federal policy that, where possible, an
Indian child should remain in the Indian community"8 9 reveals
the tenacity of systemic majority culture bias that infects many
state court evaluations of Native American children's best
interests.
b. Bonding or Attachment to Prospective Adoptive Parents
State court use of "bonding" or "attachment" theory90 simi-
larly injects majority culture values into best interest analyses
under the ICWA's good cause exception, resulting in the place-
ment of Native American children outside of their cultures. 91
Adoption cases under the ICWA often involve prospective adop-
tive parents who have a preexisting foster care relationship with
the Native American children they hope to adopt.92 Any parent-
like relationship formed between non-Native foster parents and
Native American foster children, however, necessarily results
from placement outside the ICWA's culturally based foster place-
ment preferences. 93 Furthermore, the ICWA requires applica-
88. See id. The Division of Family and Youth Services had filed a Child in
Need of Aid petition and a petition to terminate the parental rights of F.H.'s
mother. Id. at 1362. The superior court dismissed these petitions upon grant-
ing the non-Native couple's adoption. Id. at 1362 n.1. The Alaska Supreme
Court relied on the dismissal of these petitions to support its conclusion that
F.H.'s purported need for permanent placement justified a finding of good
cause. See id. at 1365 (noting that the adoption petition by the non-Native par-
ent was the only petition for custody of F.H. at the time of the appeal).
89. HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 23, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
7546.
90. Bonding or attachment theories value the relationship between chil-
dren and their "psychological parent," which has been defined as "one who, on a
continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay,
and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the
child's physical needs." JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CmLD 98 (1973).
91. See, e.g.,Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1365; In re Appeal in Maricopa
County Juvenile Action, 667 P.2d 228, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); In re Adoption
of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 312 (Ind. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069 (1989).
92. See, e.g., In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 358 (Minn. 1994),
cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1995); Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d
at 1362; In re Adoption of M., 832 P.2d 518 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
93. See supra note 22 (discussing the ICWA's foster care placement
preferences).
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tion of Native American cultural standards in foster placements
as well as in adoptive placements. 94 Yet, child welfare workers
persistently consider the same majority culture factors in mak-
ing foster placements that courts consider in making adoptive
placements. 95 Thus, granting adoptions of Native American fos-
ter children on the basis of a relationship formed with their non-
Native foster parents would in many cases reinforce a welfare
agent's initial disregard of the ICWA's foster placement provi-
sions. As the Supreme Court has stated of ICWA litigation,
"[Tihe law cannot be applied so as automatically to 'reward
those who obtain custody, whether lawfully or otherwise, and
maintain it during any ensuing (and protracted) litigation.'" 96
Placing a child's bond with two nuclear parents above other
social bonds also reflects deeply entrenched majority culture val-
ues.9 7 American majority culture considers the parent's role
paramount in child rearing.98 In Native American communities,
however, a child's bond with her biological parents may be no
more crucial to her social development than bonds with grand-
parents, relatives, and other tribal members.9 9 In addition, Na-
tive communities value cultivating ties to Native American
culture.'0 0 Anglo Americans feel no corresponding urgency to
safeguard and cultivate their children's bonds with their culture
because the values and traditions of Anglo culture permeate
majoritarian society in a way that Native values and traditions
94. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
95. One legal service attorney surveyed by the Minnesota Supreme Court
Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System reported that "the misapplica-
tion or nonapplication of the ICWA is appalling. Fourteen years after passage,
county workers are still culturally ignorant at best and racist at worst." Racial
Bias Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 631.
96. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 54
(1989) (quoting In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah 1986)).
97. Some scholars believe attachment theory overestimates the importance
of stability to the detriment of other factors. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Why
Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 458-59 (1983).
98. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (establishing the pri-
mary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children).
99. See Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 449 (contrasting the Anglo and Native
American views of individual and collective upbringing of children).
100. Congress recognized this need for cultural bonds in its findings:
"[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integ-
rity of Indian tribes than their children." 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1988). Native
American tribes have an interest in their children which "finds no parallel in
other ethnic cultures found in the United States." Adoption of Halloway, 732
P.2d at 969.
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clearly do not.' 01 Not surprisingly then, courts that bring nar-
row majority views of Native American children's complex cul-
tural needs to a best interests good cause analysis too often
place the children outside the Native American community.' 0 2
Examining parental bonding and family permanence, two
prominent factors within the best interests standard, demon-
strates that majority culture views pervade the standard. As a
result, consideration of the child's best interests under the good
cause exception to the ICWA becomes a means for courts to in-
fuse majority culture values into adoption decisions that lie at
the heart of Native American cultural interests.
2. Congress's Mandate to Apply Native American Cultural
Values in Determining the Child's Best Interests
Congress enacted the ICWA specifically to redress the insen-
sitivity of state courts to Native American cultural values in
adoption proceedings affecting Native children. 03 The ICWA's
legislative history warns courts not to use a traditional Anglo
version of the best interests standard when applying the
ICWA.' 04 Instead, in § 1915, Congress specifically requires use
101. See Jean Phinney et al., Ethnic Identity Development and Psychological
Adjustment in Adolescence, in ETHNIC IssuEs IN ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH
53, 55-57 (Arlene R. Stiffman & Larry E. Davis eds., 1990) (discussing accultur-
ation of minority teenagers to majority culture).
102. See, e.g., In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Alaska 1993); In
re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 667 P.2d 228, 234
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 312 (Ind. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069 (1989).
103. The ICWA's congressional findings specifically recognize differences be-
tween majority culture values and Native American culture values:
Recognizing the special relationship between the United States and
the Indian tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to
Indian people, the Congress finds...
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken
up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by
nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high per-
centage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive
homes and institutions; and
(5) that the states, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian
child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies,
have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian com-
munities and families.
25 U.S.C. § 1901.
104. Congress stated that the best interests standard "is vague, at best...
judges too may find it difficult, in utilizing vague standards like 'the best inter-
ests of the child,' to avoid decisions resting on subjective values." House RE-
PORT, supra note 4, at 19, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7542 (citation
omitted).
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of Native American social and cultural values in all ICWA place-
ment preference decisions 105 In effect, Congress replaced the
traditional best interests standard with the presumption that
keeping Native American children within their Native commu-
nities serves the children's best interests.' 06
In the more than fifteen years since Congress enacted the
ICWA, however, courts have largely failed to effectuate a best
interests analysis protecting the relationship between Native
American children and their cultures. Only one court has suc-
cessfully made Native American cultural values paramount in
its good cause analysis of the child's best interests.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, confronted with a case in
which three children faced continued foster care if the court de-
nied a non-Native couple's adoption petition, refused to find good
cause to depart from the ICWA's adoptive placement prefer-
ences. 10 7 In In re Custody of S.E.G., 08 the court discussed dif-
ferences between Native and non-Native cultural conceptions of
permanence, 0 9 declaring that "it is important that this need
[for permanence] not be defined so narrowly as to threaten or
substantially reduce placements in Native American homes." 0
Heeding its own warning, the court held that the children's per-
ceived needs for permanence alone did not constitute good cause
to depart from the ICWA's placement preferences."' Rather,
105. "The standards to be applied in meeting the preference requirements of
this section shall be the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian
community in which the parent or extended family resides or with which the
parent or extended family members maintain social and cultural ties." 25
U.S.C. § 1915(d).
106. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 50 n.24
(1989); In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187,
189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); In re Kahlen W.,
285 Cal. Rptr. 507, 514 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Crystal L, 276 Cal. Rptr. 619, 625
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 862 (1991); In re Baby Girl Doe, 865 P.2d 1090,
1095 (Mont. 1993); Chester County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Coleman, 372
S.E.2d 912, 914 (S.C. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 399 S.E.2d 773 (S.C. 1990),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 918 (1991); Dale, supra note 28, at 356-57.
107. In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 366 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied,
63 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1995). See supra notes 67-75 and accompany-
ing text (detailing the court's holdings).
108. 521 N.W.2d at 357.
109. Id. at 364 (discussing the ICWA's legislative history and the findings of
the Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial
System).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 366 The courts decision has also been praised for requiring
highly qualified Native American expert witnesses when determining the exist-
ence of good cause. See Siblings Can't Be Adopted, supra note 6 (quoting Mark
Fiddler, director of the Indian Child Welfare Center in Minneapolis). The court
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the court applied the definition of a child's best interests implicit
in the ICWA, 112 effectively finding that the importance of pre-
serving the children's cultural heritage through continued foster
placement outweighed the importance of placing them immedi-
ately in an adoptive home.'1 3 In re Custody of S.E.G.114 upholds
Congress's instructions to state courts that Native American
values shape determinations of good cause under the ICWA's
adoptive placement preference.
3. Holyfield's Implications for Interpreting Good Cause Under
the ICWA: Prohibiting Subjective State Court
Determinations of the Child's Best Interests
The Supreme Court's Holyfield"1 5 decision makes clear that
state courts cannot bypass the ICWA by applying state law in-
terpretations of the Act's terms, even when Congress did not de-
fine those terms. 116 Allowing state courts to do so would
contradict the general rule that Congress intends courts nation-
wide to apply federal statutes uniformly,1 7 and would ignore
the presumption against applying state law where that state
law interferes with the federal statute's policy. 118 Using the ma-
applied a stringent standard when determining the qualification of expert wit-
nesses. 521 N.W.2d at 364-65. In-depth discussion of the court's holding re-
garding expert testimony, however, exceeds the scope of this Note.
112. The ICWA's best interest standard assumes that placement in Native
American homes serves Native American children's best interests. See supra
note 106 (citing cases).
113. 521 N.W.2d at 366. The Act recognizes that placement in a foster home
or institution may replace adoptive placement: '"preadoptive placement' ...
shall mean the temporary placement of an Indian child in a foster home or in-
stitution after the termination of parental rights, but prior to or in lieu of adop-
tive placement." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(iii) (emphasis added).
114. 521 N.W.2d at 357, 366.
115. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
116. The Supreme Court stated:
First, and most fundamentally, the purpose of the ICWA gives no rea-
son to believe that Congress intended to rely on state law for the defini-
tion of a critical term; quite the contrary. It is clear from the very text
of the ICWA, not to mention its legislative history and the hearings
that led to its enactment, that Congress was concerned with the rights
of Indian families and Indian communities vis-a-vis state authori-
ties.... Indeed, the congressional findings that are a part of the stat-
ute demonstrate that Congress perceived the States and their courts as
partly responsible for the problem it intended to correct.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 44-45 (citations omitted).
117. Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1983)
(citing Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943)); United States v. Pel-
zer, 312 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1941).
118. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 44 ("A second reason for the presumption against
the application of state law is the danger that 'the federal program would be
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jority culture best interests standard to determine "good cause"
ignores the Supreme Court's prohibition of state law definitions
of the ICWA's key provisions that do not uphold the purpose of
the Act.'1 9 The application of a best interests standard to a de-
termination of good cause permits states to bypass the IOWA's
placement preferences, just the result the Court forbids in
Holyfield.120 Additionally, the best interests standard, due to its
subjective nature,' 21 promotes inconsistent application of the
Act.122 Application of the standard, consequently, embodies the
exact abuse of state court discretion that Congress intended the
IOWA to remedy. 123
B. PARENTA PREFERENCES: INSUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION TO
DEPART FROM THE ICWA's ADopTvi PLACEMENT
PREFERENCES
In addition to the best interests standard, courts commonly
look to a parent's placement preference when finding good cause
to deviate from the ICWA's order of placement. 124 Congress
noted in the Act that courts might consider, "[wihere appropri-
ate, the preference of the Indian child or parent"' 25 in determin-
impaired if state law were to control.'" (citing Jerome, 318 U.S. at 104; Dicker-
son, 460 U.S. at 119-20; Pelzer, 312 U.S. at 402-03)). Additionally, federal Na-
tive American legislation must be analyzed in light of "both the broad policies
that underlie the legislation and the history of tribal independence." Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989) (discussing pre-emp-
tion analysis).
119. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 44-45.
120. Id. at 49-50.
121. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (quoting the Minnesota
Supreme Court's requirement of a subjective standard).
122. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Adoption of N.P.S., 868 P.2d 934 (Alaska 1994) (considering
the child's deceased mother's wishes expressed in her will); In re Adoption of
F.H., 851 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993) (considering the mother's wish to place F.H.
with a non-Native family); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
511 So. 2d 918 (Miss. 1987) (finding parent's preference relevant in refusing to
transfer jurisdiction to tribal court), rev'd, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
125. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (emphasis added). The BIA Guidelines also provide
that parental preference can be a basis for a finding of good cause not to follow
the statutory order of placement preferences. BIA Guidelines, supra note 9, at
67,594.
Section 1915(c) further provides that if a consenting parent wishes to re-
main anonymous, the court must weigh the parent's wishes when applying the
preferences. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988). One court, in considering this provi-
sion, held that a tribe's right to enforce the IOWA's adoptive placement prefer-
ences prevailed over the Native American parent's statutorily recognized
interest in anonymity. In re Baby Girl Doe, 865 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Mont. 1993).
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ing good cause.126 Parents of Native American children and
state courts relying on this language have often completely dis-
regarded the tribal and cultural interests underlying the ICWA's
placement provisions. 127 In light of prevailing Native American
cultural standards and the Supreme Court's Holyfield128 deci-
sion, however, courts should rarely determine that the parent's
request constitutes good cause to depart from the placement
preferences. 129
Refusing to honor a parent's placement preference arguably
ignores the Act's language 13 0 and denies Native American par-
ents their right to decide who will raise their children.131 The
ICWA, however, grants Native American parents a right only to
decide whether to keep their child or place it for adoption.
132 If
126. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c).
127. In 1984 hearings, Congress heard the following testimony:
The states are using [§ 1915(c)] with parents to have the parent[s] re-
quest that the Indian Child Welfare Act not be applied at all, or to
request that the child be placed contrary to the preferences of the Act.
This intimidation on the part of state courts and agencies was one of
the major problems addressed by the Indian Child Welfare Act, and
the practice should not be permitted to continue under the placement
section as written. The Act states specifically in the legislative history
that it is the child's right as an Indian which should control even over
parental preference.
1984 Hearings, supra note 10, at 168 (prepared testimony of the Navajo Na-
tion). See also Joan H. Hollinger, Beyond the Best Interests of the Tribe: The
Indian Child Welfare Act and the Adoption of Indian Children, 66 U. DEW. L.
REv. 451, 472 (1989) ("[Many parents of Indian children attempt to evade the
ICWA goal of tribal control over Indian children by intentionally placing their
children with non-Indian adopters.").
128. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
129. Courts should never consider a parent's placement preference when
that parent's parental rights have been terminated. Section 1915 of the ICWA
"contemplates those instances where the parental rights of the Indian parent
has [sic] already been terminated." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 23, re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7546. When the court has terminated parental
rights, it is inconsistent to give the terminated parent a measure of control over
a child's placement. Barsh, supra note 36, at 1331 ("Remembering that the Act
effectively limits involuntary child custody proceedings to instances of parental
abuse or neglect, it is questionable whether parents' choice of a substitute home
for the child should be given great weight.").
130. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c).
131. During a hearing in 1988 to consider amendments to the ICWA, one
witness testified that the ICWA infringes on a mother's rights to "determin[e]
what the best interests of the child are, [and] subject[s] the interests of the child
to the interests of the tribe." To Amend the Indian Child Welfare Act: Hearings
on S.1976 Before the Senate Select Comm. On Indian Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 48 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Hearings] (testimony of Ross Swimmer, Asst.
Secretary for Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior).
132. In re Baby Girl A., 282 Cal. Rptr. 105, 110 (Ct. App. 1991).
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a parent decides to place her child for adoption, "her choice of
adopting parents is not entirely unfettered."133 In addition, Na-
tive American cultures reject the idea that one parent can uni-
laterally remove a child from her extended family and
culture.13 4 As a result, a court properly applying the "prevailing
social and cultural standards of the Indian community"13 5
should generally refuse to comply with the parent's request.
In Holyfield,13 6 for example, the Supreme Court held that a
child's parents cannot defeat tribal jurisdiction by giving birth
off a reservation.137 Allowing the parents' wishes to prevail over
the tribe's interests, the Court stated, would "nullify the purpose
the ICWA was intended to accomplish."138 To do so would result
in more placements outside the tribe, thus threatening the
tribe's existence. Similarly, allowing a parent's placement pref-
erence to defeat the statute's placement preferences denies the
133. Id.
134. One commentator, refuting the argument that the ICWA infringes on a
parent's rights stated: "The concept that a mother has the right to remove her
child from its extended family and community, thereby depriving the child of its
heritage... is foreign to American Indian cultures." Goldsmith, supra note 83,
at 8 (citations omitted).
Similarly, Congress heard testimony in 1988 regarding Native American
cultural relations:
Indian people have two relational systems. They have a biological re-
lational system, and they have a clan or band relational system. It is
the convergence, if you will, of these two systems in tribal society that
creates the fabric of tribal life. And each of us as an Indian person has
a very specific place in the fabric. We have very specific responsibili-
ties within the fabric. Those responsibilities are our rights, individual
rights. And even our mother has no right to deny us those rights.
... Unfortunately, the resistance to an understanding of our phi-
losophy remains strong. In fact, as we heard today, frankly, corrupted.
1988 Hearings, supra note 131, at 97-98 (statement of Evelyn Blanchard, Vice
President, National Indian Social Workers Association). Cf. Lacey, supra note
16, at 341-43, 346-47 (comparing 19th century Anglo-American and Native
American values regarding individualism, education, and discipline of
children).
135. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
136. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
137. Id. The Court found that "Congress was concerned not solely about the
interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes
themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians."
Id. at 49.
138. Id. at 52. The court went on to cite a "scholarly and sensitive opinion in
what has become a leading case on the ICWA," which stated: "'The protection of
this tribal interest is at the core of the ICWA, which recognizes that the tribe
has an interest in the child which is distinct from but on parity with the inter-
est of the parents.'" Id. (citing In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969-
70 (Utah 1986)).
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tribe's interest in the child, which Congress considered
paramount.139
The reasoning of Holyfield'40 indicates strongly that the pa-
rental placement preference does not justify departing from the
ICWA's order of preferences, even in voluntary adoption proceed-
ings.14 ' If the parents of a Native American child cannot defeat
tribal jurisdiction by physically leaving tribal boundaries, they
should not be able to attain the same end by expressing a prefer-
ence for their child's placement in a non-Native American set-
ting.142 Alienating a child from her cultural heritage and
causing the tribe's loss of a resource vital to its continued exist-
ence 143 comprise the exact results Congress intended the ICWA
139. "[Section 1915] seeks to protect the rights of the Indian child as an In-
dian and the rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children
in its society." HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 23, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7546.
140. 490 U.S. at 30.
141. Voluntary proceedings arise when a parent's rights have not been in-
voluntarily terminated, but the parent wishes to place his or her child for adop-
tion, as in Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 30. The placement preference controls both
voluntary and involuntary adoption actions. In re Adoption of Child of Indian
Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 931-32 (N.J. 1988); In re Custody of S.B.R., 719 P.2d
154, 156 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (applying the ICWA to voluntary relinquish-
ment of child for adoption). See also Roger A. Tellinghuisen, The Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: A Practical Guide with [Limited] Commentary, 34 S.D. L.
REV. 660, 688-90 (1989). But see In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168
(Kan. 1982) (holding that the ICWA does not apply where an unwed non-Indian
mother voluntarily relinquishes her child for adoption shortly after birth).
Congress anticipated the dangers posed by voluntary actions: "[Tihe volun-
tary waiver of parental rights is a device widely employed by social workers to
gain custody of children." HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 11, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C-A.N. at 7533. For a compelling disclosure of the use of voluntary adop-
tions by private adoption agencies as a device to place Native children outside
the Native American community, see Oversight Hearings on the Indian Child
Welfare Act: Before the Select Committee On Indian Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 362-66 (1987) (stating that private adoption agencies in Alaska "consist-
ently show an utter disregard for the Indian Child Welfare Act and the values it
embodies" and that the Alaskan agencies "are in the adoption business"). See
also 1984 Hearings, supra note 10, at 107-08 (statement of Ethel C. Krepps,
President, Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Association) (describing an affidavit
used by independent adoption agencies to bypass the ICWA).
142. Placement of Native American children in non-Native American set-
tings has the same effect on the children and the tribes whether or not the
placement is voluntary. Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d at
932.
143. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 ("Congress finds... that there is no resource that is
more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their
children.").
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to remedy."' The Holyfield"45 decision apparently would not
preclude consideration, however, of a parent's placement prefer-
ence within the Native American community because such con-
sideration is within the Act's placement preferences and in
accord with the Act's purpose.
III. ACHIEVING COMPLIANCE WITH THE ICWA'S
ORDER OF ADOPTIVE PLACEMENTS: ABOLISHING THE
GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION
Congress enacted the ICWA to remedy abuses of state
courts' traditional discretion over adoption cases involving Na-
tive American children.' 46 Nonetheless, the ICWA's legislative
history reveals Congress's intent to afford state courts some flex-
ibility through judicial application of the ICWA's good cause pro-
visions. 147 Thus far, many state courts have been unable to
shed their majority culture views of child welfare and have re-
peatedly disregarded the ICWA's substantive purpose of pre-
serving Native American cultures. 148 State court resistance to
the ICWA has also impeded fulfillment of its purposes. As one
trial court judge tellingly characterized the ICWA's requirement
of finding relatives for placement, it is merely a "hoop" to jump
through. 49 Such courts seem to harbor animosity toward the
Act's purpose. 150 If the ICWA placement preferences have be-
come merely "hoops" to jump through before ultimately applying
144. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text (describing Congess's in-
tent when enacting the ICWA).
145. .490 U.S. 30 (1989).
146. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (describing displacement
of Native American children).
147. BIA Guidelines, supra note 9, at 67,584. As the Minnesota Supreme
Court pointed out, this section of the BIA Guidelines cites to the legislative
history of the good cause provision contained in § 1911, referring to jurisdiction,
not the good cause provision of 25 U.S.C. § 1915. In re Custody of S.E.G., 521
N.W.2d 357, 362 n.4 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Jan. 23,
1995).
148. See, e.g., In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993); In re
Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 667 P.2d 228 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1983).
149. Racial Bias Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 640 (citing Trial Court
Memorandum, In re Welfare of M.S.S. (Nov. 19, 1991) (on file with the Minne-
sota Supreme Court)). The Task Force concludes that "[t]his misunderstanding
and disregard of the law are far from unusual." Id.
150. "[Tlhere is clearly a great deal of hostility among some judges and court
personnel as [the ICWA] relates to Native American foster care placement. For
example, one practitioner reported that a judge, although reluctantly signing
an order, stated in another words, counselor, when an Indian child is involved,
our hands are tied.'" Racial Bias Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 640. An-
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the courts' own views of the child's best interests,' 51 Congress
must act to tighten courts' use of the good cause exception.
Amendments to the ICWA must redirect judicial focus to the
Act's purpose of keeping Native children in Native communities.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in In re Custody of
S.E.G.,152 took a step in the right direction by applying the BIA
Guidelines factors' 5 3 to its analysis of good cause.154 Mandatory
application of a uniform set of federal guidelines like those ad-
vanced by the BIA would remove some of state courts' discretion
under the good cause exception. Such mandatory guidelines
would not, however, advance the Act's purposes far enough. The
BIA Guidelines unequivocally defer to the parent's placement
preference, 55 effectively making the parent's interest para-
mount, contrary to the purpose of the Act.' 56 In addition, a uni-
form set of factors necessarily denies the reality that Native
American cultures differ from each other, as well as from the
majority culture. 157 As a result, a uniform set of guidelines
would most likely reflect only one Native culture, or worse,
would once again reflect majority culture values.
Congress could better solve the problem by creating a firm
presumption that state courts must place all Native American
children available for adoption in Native American adoptive
families absent one of several specific exceptions. 158 This pre-
other judge, responding to an open-ended survey question about the IOWA,
stated simply: "Eliminate it. Is unconstitutional." Id.
151. See supra part U.A (discussing use of the best interests standard by
state courts).
152. 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Jan.
23, 1995).
153. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (discussing the BIA
Guidelines factors for determining good cause to depart from the statutory
adoptive placement preferences).
154. 521 N.W.2d at 363.
155. BIA Guidelines, supra note 9, at 67,594.
156. See supra part I.B (discussing reasons the parent's preference should
not be considered, despite Congress's statement that it should be considered
"where appropriate").
157. See supra note 19 (discussing tribal differences and the difficulty of
making general statements regarding all Native Americans).
158. Senator Daniel Evans of Washington introduced a bill in the 100th
Congress containing amendments to § 1915 similar to those proposed here. See
S.1976, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 1988 Hearings, supra note
131, at 3-45. The bill's primary provisions expanded the applicability of the
IOWA by redefining "child custody proceeding," id. at 7-8, and "Indian child," id.
at 9-10. It also abolished the good cause provision of § 1915 and permitted de-
parture from the placement preferences only in specific instances. Id. at 24-27.
Finally, the bill restricted consideration of the parent's placement preference.
Id. at 26.
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sumption should abolish the ICWA's "good cause to the con-
trary"15 9 language altogether. Congress should require that any
placement outside the Act's order of placement must not endan-
ger the "rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of
the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its
society."160 Thus, the amendment would allow placement
outside the community only if the child retains her relationship
with her Native American culture and the placement meets one
of a few possible strictly defined exceptions. 161
Any exceptions must reflect the ICWA's underlying policy of
protecting the child's and tribe's interests, as well as the Act's
remedial purpose of restricting state court discretion in Native
American child custody matters. 62 Such exceptions would re-
quire precise definitions of key provisions to remove state court
discretion. One such exception might be a permissive departure
from the placement presumption when the child's tribe consents
to the departure. 163 This exception would allow the court to re-
tain control over the matter without imposing majority culture
values on the decision. Another possible exception might arise
when the child's extraordinary medical needs could be accommo-
dated only through a placement outside the presumption. These
exceptions must, at all times, recognize the child's interests as a
The bill died in committee at the end of the 100th Congress. John Robert
Renner, The Indian Child Welfare Act and Equal Protection Limitations on the
Federal Power Over Indian Affairs, 17 Am. INIAN L. Rlv. 129, 130 (1992).
159. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
160. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 23, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
7546.
161. This situation would require the court to insure that the child's tribal
ties are preserved, despite the placement outside the statutory order. Such a
placement would resemble an "open" adoption. See Hollinger, supra note 127,
at 497-99 (describing attempts to place Native American children in "open
adoption" settings).
162. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 45
(1989) ("Congress perceived the States and their courts as partly responsible for
the problem it intended to correct [by passing the ICWA]."); see 25 U.S.C.
§ 1901(5) (finding that state "judicial bodies ... have often failed to recognize
the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social stan-
dards prevailing in Indian communities and families").
An exception's proponent should be required to meet a high burden of proof
in recognition of the unique relationship between the child and the tribe. See
supra note 24 (discussing the burden of proof requirement).
163. One commentator supported this suggestion when stating that "[olnly
an explicit waiver by the child's tribe, or other substantial reasons should per-
mit a court to decline to follow the placement preferences." Hollinger, supra
note 31, § 15.06(1).
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Native American and the tribe's interests in controlling its
future.
CONCLUSION
State courts abusing the good cause exception to the ICWA's
placement preference contribute to grossly disproportionate
placement rates of Native American children outside their cul-
tures. Through their evaluations of various forms of the major-
ity culture best interests standard or the parental placement
preference, state courts disregard the unique relationship be-
tween Native American tribes and their children. The remedy
for this difficult problem lies in amending the ICWA's adoptive
placement preference provision. Congress must require state
courts to place children within the order of preferences set out
by the Act and allow the courts to deviate from this order only
upon a finding of certain precisely defined exceptions. This pro-
posed amendment would protect the interests of Native Ameri-
can tribes and their children in maintaining their relationships
with one another.
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